niversal means-tested programs are an important component of welfare systems in many countries. Their defining characteristic is that all individuals whose income falls below a legal threshold are eligible to receive the benefits, which makes them an effective instrument to reduce poverty and income inequality. This concept of income redistribution is relatively old in developed countries, but it has only recently become prominent in developing ones where levels of poverty and income inequality are higher and, as a consequence, welfare programs are bound to cover a much larger proportion of the population.
The most widely adopted means-tested programs in Latin America are conditional cash transfers (CCTs). They deliver a predetermined amount of cash to eligible families and impose education and/or health conditionalities on their children. If these conditionalities are not met by recipients, the benefits may be discontinued 1 . In Brazil, in 1995, the municipality of Campinas and the Federal District were the first subnational units to launch such programs, both named Bolsa Escola. In the following years, similar programs were launched all across the country by state and municipal administrations, and the federal government also Conditional cash transfers are highly visible social policies with important political consequences. Scholars claim that they positively affect electoral support among the poor for incumbent candidates (DE LA O, 2013; DÍAZ-CAYEROS, ESTEVES and MAGALONI, 2009; HUNTER and POWER, 2007; LICIO, RENNÓ and CASTRO, 2009; MANACORDA, MIGUEL and VIGORITO, 2011; NICOLAU and PEIXOTO, 2007; NUPIA, 2011; QUEIROLO, 2010; ZUCCO, 2008 ZUCCO, , 2013 . Supporting evidence comes primarily from studies of national programs and presidential elections taking place in a few Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay and Colombia. To date, almost no attention has been paid to similar 1 In most countries, the benefits are not automatically discontinued after the beneficiaries' first failure to meet the program's conditionalities, as a long process of following up with them normally ensues. por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD), the personal income cutoff was set at R$1,100.00 (value in 2004) . The sample consisted of 1,500 respondents and was geographically stratified by three macro-regions. These macro-regions were defined according to residents' predominant social class, and were labeled peripheral (predominantly inhabited by the poor), intermediate (predominantly inhabited by the middle class), and central (predominantly inhabited by the rich). A quota sampling method was applied in each stratum, so that 40% earned less R$520,00 (lower income bracket) and 60% earned between R$520 and R$1,100.00 (upper income bracket); 50% were male and 50% female; 30% were between 18 and 29 years old, 45% were between 30 and 49, and 25% were older than 50. The researchers estimated the total population for each combination of quotas and strata and calculated expansion factors for each To test this hypothesis, I analyzed data from the survey described above.
Among the 1,500 respondents, 234 (15.6% of the sample) declared they had received grants from at least one cash transfer program, and 42 of those 234 benefitted from more than one. Among the cash transfer recipients, 157 benefitted from Renda Mínima, 16 from Renda Cidadã, 27 from Bolsa Escola, and 76 from Bolsa Família. The most common case of double benefits involved Renda Mínima and Bolsa Família (33 cases). An important analytical advantage of using this survey to assess differences in the behavior of Renda Mínima beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is that it was applied only to the 40% poorest citizens, which reduces considerably the socioeconomic differences among them. Still, the composition of the two groups was different in several aspects, as can be seen in Table 01 , and these differences could potentially explain the variation in their electoral behavior. Therefore, all of the models estimated below include binary variables indicating these characteristics as controls. The results of two groups of models, all of them using sampling weights, are reported below. The first group of models predicts the vote for the incumbent candidate Marta Suplicy and is displayed on Table 02 ; the second group of models predicts the vote for the main challenger, José Serra, and is displayed on Table 04 . About 22% of respondents (334 out of 1,500) were dropped from the sample, either because they were registered to vote in another municipality or because they did not register at all. The main explanatory variable is a dummy indicating that the respondent is a Renda Mínima beneficiary. Dummies were also included for beneficiaries of other cash transfer programs, as well as interactions between them and the main explanatory variable, in order to evaluate whether the electoral effect of Renda Mínima was conditional on participation in other CCTs. Table 02 reports results of four models predicting the vote for the incumbent candidate. 56.17*** 56.25*** 58.13*** 58.29*** Note: Significance levels: *** < 0.01; ** < 0.05; * < 0. Mínima. All of these models systematically suggest a strong effect of the municipal cash transfer program, which is substantially greater than the effect of any other variable. The models also suggest that race and area of residence had a significant effect on voters' choices, but to a much lower degree than Renda Mínima. None of the interactions are significant but, as insightfully explained by Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) , this does not mean the absence of conditional effects. Models 03 and 04 allow us to estimate the effect of Renda Mínima among those who did not benefit from other programs and among those who did. This can be done by adding the coefficients and recalculating the standard errors for these sums. For example, according to model 03, the effect of Renda Mínima among beneficiaries of other programs is the sum of the coefficients for "Renda Mínima" and "Renda Mínima × Any other CCT". The effect among those who did not benefit from any other program is just the coefficient for "Renda Mínima" because the interaction equals zero. Therefore, the fact that the coefficients for the interactions included in models 03 and 04 are negative suggests that the pro-incumbent effect of Renda Mínima is considerably lower among those who benefitted from the state or federal cash transfer programs.
In logit models, the association between independent and dependent variables is assumed to be non-linear and to depend on the values of all other variables included in the model. Thus, the interpretation of coefficients is not straightforward, as it is in linear regression models. One of the most common approaches to interpreting the results of logit models is to calculate average marginal effects (AME); that is, the mean effect of the explanatory variable for all possible combinations of values of the control variables. I followed the standard practice and calculated AMEs of Renda Mínima for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of other cash transfer programs, based on results of models 03 and 04. The results are reported in Table 03 . Non-beneficiaries of Bolsa Família 0.29*** 1107 Note. Significance levels: *** < 0.01; ** < 0.05; * < 0.1 Source: Survey "Acesso da população mais pobre de São Paulo a serviços públicos", CEM-CEBRAP/IBOPE, 2004.
The table shows that those beneficiaries of Renda Mínima who did not benefit from any other CCT program were almost thirty percentage points more likely to vote for the incumbent candidate than were other respondents. This effect considerably decreases and loses statistical significance among respondents who were already benefitting from other programs. Models for the runoff election (omitted here) lead to the exact same conclusions. This important finding suggests that the potential for social policies to boost electoral support for the chief executive at one level of government decreases, and perhaps disappears, if eligible recipients benefit from programs implemented by overlapping administrations at other levels. This is true even for situations in which the administration of the other tier is led by a co-partisan chief executive, as attested by the non-significance of Renda Mínima among Bolsa Família recipients 3 .
I also estimated models predicting the vote for both the main challenger and the winner of that election, José Serra. These models are analogous to the ones reported above, with one exception: model 02 includes an indicator of participation in Renda Cidadã, the CCT program implemented by the governor of the state of Sao Paulo, who was Serra's co-partisan. Since only two Renda Cidadã recipients also benefitted from Renda Mínima, I did not include an interaction between them on model 04, but did include one between Renda Mínima and Bolsa Família, as I did before. The results are reported below. The table reveals that Renda Mínima decreased the likelihood of a vote for Serra by about twenty percentage points, on average. Substantively, the effect is the same for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of other programs, but it did not reach statistical significance among respondents who also benefitted from Bolsa Família 4 . This suggests that, in an environment where citizens may benefit from different redistributive programs controlled by competing federal jurisdictions, the dynamics of the "anti-challenger" effect may be interestingly different from the dynamics of the "pro-incumbent" effect of those programs. Whereas the proincumbent effect of the municipal program was considerably weaker and insignificant among recipients of other programs, its anti-challenger effect might very well be the same among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of other programs, although this hypothesis calls for further inquiry.
Conclusion
The main objective of this research note was to assess whether cash transfer programs increase electoral support for incumbent mayors in the same (2015) 9 (2) 109 -120 
